Greg Detre
Wednesday, 31 May, 2000
Helen Seward from Victoria�s notes
theseus� ship � if you gradually replace the planks one by one with new ones
most people say: the ship stays the same, i.e. a completely re-constructed ship is still the same as the old one
but if you tell them: all the old planks have been kept �
this competitor ship throws our original intuitions
it�s our names and use of language giving us problems
what�s it to say that �this is this� and �that is that� � in the case of a ship, for example, it�s arbitrary
in the case of a mind, it should be different because it�s self-identifying (�it can say that I am me�)
but, you have the problem of gradual unnoticeable changes
yes, but if someone can retain their identity after having their corpus callosum cut, then they can be a single person with a divided mind and two bodies
but if the two hemispheres are separate, how can they be one? how?
and, what about phineas gage
could he be said to have preserved his identity, even though he inhabited the same brain (give or take a few bits) and the same body? is he still the same person?
well, he does share the memories, but not the faculties + personality
Williams: psychological continuity isn�t one-one, so it can�t be a ground for speaking of identity
Parfit: when it is one-one, psychological continuity can be a ground for speaking of identity
parfit � talks about quasi-memories (seem to remember???) + quasi-intentions
doesn�t talk about character traits
psychological connectedness = matter of degree
(as opp to psychological continuity = yes/no)
identity = yes/no
but sometimes in problem cases, can be indeterminate ???
Locke + Butler debate: can�t analyse identity in terms of memory because memory presupposes identity
q-memory = natural next step
a memory doesn�t count unless the past experience is causally related to the memory � it�s not enough for them simply to match
psychological connectedness = holding of direct psychological relations
diagram � splits and splits selves like branches on a tree
direct, e.g. q-memory and the experience q-remembered
(not transitive)
past vs ancestral cells
Reid�s Brave Officer � objection to Lockean theory of personal identity
a general in later life remembers being a brave officer who captured a flag
the brave officer can remember being a boy swiping apples from the orchard
but the old general can�t remember being a boy
general + boy � psychological continuity, but not continuity (at least not in memory)
mad scientist � clones himself, then sends off the clones on kamikaze missions
they are psychologically continuous (but fission is different)
should have equal regard for all of them � but we only care about the one we turn out to be, as Parfit says
but he claims that psychological continuity is all that matters???
if you want to attack Parfit, might have to go back to the Shoemaker case
I am more intimately related to my body, not just as a brain in a body � it wouldn�t be me if I was in a different body
empirical facts relating brain to its housing body
just because a brain transplant is conceivable (as mind-body zombie distinctions seem conceivable), doesn�t mean that there isn�t a systematic and intimate unseparable brain-body relation
what about if you sew a monkey�s head onto another�s body � isn�t the same monkey � what a weird question
because we have a 1st person view, we can�t view humans in the same way as monkeys
the question of personal identity might not have an answer
why does he assume that half a brain in each body will preserve psychological identity?
why can�t/won�t they each take on their own identity
what is psychological connectedness?
fusion = like having a full-grown child???
natural division = cloning???
Parfit � fission preserves some spatiotemporal continuity
think of future selves more like you think of others � implications for other minds (ancestrally related to self???) and for my future selves